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MODELLING COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS AND STRATEGIC GROUP
IMPACTS ON STRATEGY FORMULATION
This paper attempts to model the role of strategic groups in the strategy
formulation process from both an industry structure and a cognitive perspective. A
model of the process is then presented which simultaneously incorporates both
viewpoints. Relationships between external events and intra-industry instability are
suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years the strategic group concept has become an accepted
element in the environmental analysis phase of strategy formulation. Porter (1980)
provided the rationale for the development of a simple strategic group map and most
strategy textbooks have incorporated some version of his conceptualization (eg.
Thompson and Strickland, 1990). In recent years two major additions to the original
concept have been presented. First, Cool. (1985) and Fiegenbaum (1987) presented
strategic groups as dynamic, industry wide concepts whose impact on strategy
formulation changes over time. They showed how over time there were periods of
group stability broken by strategic discontinuity. During these periods of discontinuity,
strategic group membership changed. Later, Fombrum and Zajac (1987), Porac,
Thomas and Emme (1987), Reger (1988) and Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989)
presented an alternative conceptualization of strategic groupings. Their group maps
were drawn based on the cognitive constructs of practitioners rather then on a
statistical analysis of variables thought to represent the industry's key dimensions.
They argue that it is this cognitive map, shared by industry members and enacted
through environmental interactions (Weick, 1979), which directly influences strategy
formulation decisions.
The simultaneous development of conceptualizations based on cognitive and
economic concepts is not surprising given the grounding of the field of Strategic
Management. The fields of Organizational Behavior (OB) and Industrial Organization
Economics (IO) are both seen as disciplines from which strategic management models
are derived. Recent work on other questions in Strategic Management has attempted
to simultaneously measure the impact of OB and IO factors on performance (Hansen
and Wernerfelt, 1989). In that research impacts of an OB model of performance
based on organizational climate and an IO model which included firm size and
market share were integrated and a significant contribution by each toward a total
measure of firm performance was observed from both sources.
In this paper a theoretical pluralism viewpoint is advanced suggesting that a
multi-lensed view of questions in Strategic Management will provide richer analysis
and a series of eclectic models in areas where researchers are still working to develop
comprehensive models. With respect to the focus on strategic groups, an attempt is
made to present both cognitive and economic based dynamic models of the different
roles strategic groups are thought to play in the strategy formulation process. Three
different models for viewing the role of strategic groups in the formulation process
are presented. Two of the models will be derived from the existing literature, one
from economics and one from cognitive psychology. Key external variables and their
impacts on each process will also be examined. A more integrated comprehensive
model is then presented and suggestions for testing this integrated model are made.
A concluding section examines future research including the impacts of strategic
groups on resource allocation decisions which flow from strategy formulation
processes. General implications and directions for future research are also presented.
THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
The original concept of a strategic group was proposed by Hunt (1972) in
order to describe the asymmetry he observed in the strategies of members of the
"white goods" industry. The firms he observed did not all follow a single strategy nor
were the strategies randomly dispersed among the various combinations of available
strategic choices. Instead, firms clumped around certain combinations of resource
allocation and strategic choices. Hunt's work was the beginning of a stream of papers
from Harvard University which sought to explain this phenomenon in terms of
Industrial Organization (IO) economics (eg. Porter, 1973; Newman, 1973; Caves and
Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979). In this approach researchers sought to modify the
elements of the classic Bain (1959) paradigm so as to fit into the empirical results
produced. Caves and Porter (1977), for example, modified the term "entry barriers"
into "mobility barriers". Traditional IO variables for analyzing industries were used
for grouping in these and other studies. Newman (1973) used vertical integration,
Porter (1973) used firm size and Oster (1982) used advertising ratios. All of this
work sought to provide a single "map" or industry representation which would show
the industry grouping structure. This intra-industry structure was seen in IO as a
primary reason for variations in performance among industry members (Porter, 1979).
Consistent with the IO economics view, the activities of the top management team do
not play a major role in the formation of groups. Therefore, the firm level cognitive
processes of top level decision makers are not formally considered in a traditional
Industrial Organization based model.
Over a similar time period researchers in strategic management have pursued
an analysis of the strategic group concept independent of, but often influenced by, IO
Economics. Initial work in strategy was done by Hatten, Schendel, Patton, Cooper
and others at Purdue University (Hatten & Schendel, 1977; Hatten, Schendel &
Cooper, 1978; Patton, 1976; Schendel & Patton, 1978). This line of research
approached strategic grouping differently than the industry wide orientation of IO
economics. The Purdue stream sought to focus on individual firms and their patterns
of competition. Underlying the research were the strategic management assumptions
of firm heterogeneity and a relationship between that heterogeneity and prior
managerial decisions. Other researchers in strategic management also worked to
develop an understanding of strategic grouping (See: McGee and Thomas, 1986, for
a review). These studies focused on the relationships between groups and target
markets (Harrigan, 1983), groups and risk levels (Ryans & Wittink, 1986; Baird &
Sudharshan, 1983) and groups and Porter's (1980) generic classifications (Dess &
Davis, 1984). Although all of these researchers examined strategic groups from
different perspectives, they shared some common traits. The first trait was the belief
that the researcher could objectively select the variables which would represent the
strategic dimensions on which the groupings would be based. Such a view reflects an
assumption that these objective criteria can be identified from a list of structural
factors such as firm size or advertising levels and that each firm predicates its
resource allocation decisions on these factors. A second trait of this research was the
view that given these chosen dimensions, the industry's strategic grouping could be
generally modeled with a single group map and at any point in time this single
grouping would provide information on management's strategic options by exposing
competitive threats and opportunities (Porter, 1980). A third trait was an implication
of the heterogeneity of profitability among the groups. Here the IO based concept of
mobility barriers would provide member firms of more desirable groups with economic
profits (Caves & Porter, 1977; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). It was implied that by
analyzing the profitability of different groups, more or less desirable strategies could
be discovered. Not only would such results support the strategic group's theoretical
existence, it would provide pragmatic justification for the research by providing
managers with information which would help them compete more effectively.
McGee (1985) and McGee and Thomas (1986) pointed out some major
weaknesses in the strategic group concept as it existed in the mid-1980s. One such
weakness was the limited amount of dynamic research which had been done in
studying strategic group change. This was closely tied to a second point: if strategic
groups research is to live up to its promise, then it will have to be shown to be of
value to practitioners in strategy formulation. For example, by understanding the
current strategic group postures of competitors, a manager may be able to predict
varying competitor responses to future changes in the task environment. Cool (1985)
and Fiegenbaum (1987) also make this point and they simultaneously developed
dynamic models of strategic groups in a single industry. Looking at the
pharmaceutical and insurance industries respectively, they attempted to identify points
in time where the intra-industry structure changed. They also sought to test
differences in return, risk and risk-adjusted return between the groups derived in each
time period. Some supporting results were provided by each study, but both studies
also showed the need for a richer model to more fully explore groups and their
impact on managerial decisions.
Fiegenbaum (1977) suggested a process for enriching this understanding by
introducing and testing the concept of the strategic group as a "reference group".
This concept draws on the disciplines of IO economics and social psychology. It
suggests that during periods of group stability managers are constantly adjusting
resource allocations toward an idealized mix, or norm, for their strategic group.
Using partial adjustment equations Fiegenbaum tested and found support for this idea.
Although this point of his research suggests the need for a cognitive component in
developing groupings, Fiegenbaum relied on the IO based method for determining
group dimensions and memberships. As with prior conceptualizations of the role of
strategic groups in strategy formulation both Fiegenbaum and Cool represent the
grouping as a "objectively" drawn structuring of the whole industry. The term
"objective" and its variations is used throughout this paper to refer to the way in
which researchers select variables to be used in producing a representation of intra-
industry structure. As Hatten and Hatten (1987) point out, there is no "real" group at
all - all groups are analytical and conceptual constructs. However, the analytical and
conceptual constraints derived from neo-classical economics are often times presented
as "objective" reality and so will be referred to as such here.
AN "OBJECTIVE" MODEL OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
As McGee and Thomas's earlier criticism indicated, conceptual strategies need
to be formulated in dynamic environments. While it is difficult to model continuous
change in groupings, both Cool (1985) and Fiegenbaum (1987) developed nearly
similar techniques for identifying periods of relative strategic stability interrupted by
periods of change. Fiegenbaum called these periods, "stable strategic time periods"
(SSTPs). By looking at a series of SSTPs over a long period, both Cool and
Fiegenbaum were able to show patterns of change in the intra-industry structure of
the industries they studied. Each SSTP was terminated because a sufficiently large
number of firms made simultaneous changes in resource allocations. These strategy
changes reflected the efforts of individual firms to move from one strategic group to
another or of whole groups of firms moving in strategic space. It is noted in both
studies that these changes are not random or smooth over time. Instead, they occur
in bunches at one instant in time and the implication is drawn that the industry has
received a "shock" of some sort which has created new opportunities or threats in the
task environment to which the firms are responding. It is this response to a
discontinuity in the environment which may lead to an unusually high number of firms
changing strategies at one point in time. These sources of discontinuity became an
important part of a dynamic model of strategic groups.
The impact of external technological discontinuity on the stability of an industry
has been suggested by Tushman and Anderson (1987). Their research proposes that
with respect to industries as a whole changes in the underlying technology can either
enhance or destroy a firm's current competitive position. With respect to a strategic
group model, Tushman and Anderson's idea can be enhanced in two ways. First, it is
suggested that in addition to changes in technology, changes in the
legal/political/regulatory environment can produce shocks. This is consistent with
both normative models (Thompson, 1967) and recent empirical research (Franko,
1989). Also, shocks may be brought about by an action of an individual industry
member. A merger, acquisition or takeover of one firm may significantly alter the
pattern of competition in the industry. Prospect Theory (Kahnemen & Tversky, 1979)
suggests that troubled firms may make unexpected and risky changes due to their poor
competitive positions (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Impacts from any of these
sources could provide the impetus for significant changes in the strategic groupings
and the industry competitive environment. An "objective" view of strategic groups
would suggest that these external discontinuities impact the competitive environment
in a deterministic manner, changing supply and demand conditions in the competitive
environment and causing strategic responses from firms which will be homogeneous
within groups and heterogeneous between groups.
The above literature gives an economic based model for conceptualizing
strategic groups.
Insert Figure 1 about here
In this model it is assumed that an "objective" Strategic Group structure (OGt ) exists
at any point in time, t. This grouping consists of the member firms, their mobility
barriers and associated performance traits (risk, return, risk adjusted return). This
grouping of competitors is an input to the strategy formulation process (SFP). It is
suggested that this intra-industry structure has a significant impact on the process
(SFP) and, hence, on a firm's resource allocation decisions (RAD) which emerge from
it. As a result comparisons of the resource allocation decisions emerging from the
strategy formulation process of individual firms can be used as the measures of group
dimensions and group membership (eg. advertising spending in Oster (1982); R&D
spending in Cool (1985)). Over time a stable grouping continues until a significantly
disruptive discontinuity occurs in the task environment. These disruptions may take
the form of Technological Change (TC), Legal, Political and Regulatory Change (RC)
and other firm's resource allocation decisions (OFRDCs). These factors impact on
the emerging new group structure by altering the costs and benefits associated with
each firm maintaining current group membership or of switching groups. In this same
vein resource allocation decisions (RAD) of the prior stable time period (SSTP) also
impact the new group structure. Inertia, fixed capital and idiosyncratic investments
will all influence how individual firms will position themselves in the new groupings
(Rumelt, 1981). Not all groups in the industry will be impacted in the same way by
the disruptive change (Porter 1980) but enough will so that a new stable structure will
emerge. This new structure will then continue until yet another discontinuity occurs
and the restructuring process begins over again.
A MODEL OF THE COGNITIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
STRATEGIC GROUPS
Model 1 seems to be the model which underlies most of the current strategic
group research in the strategy field. However questions can be raised as to whether
it is a complete or an accurate as a predictive model. One criticism of the above
model is that the objectively drawn group map is not the cognitive construction of
firm groupings a manager may be using when assessing the impact of, for instance, a
technological change. Fiegenbaum's recent work may fit within the Model 1
framework. However, his concept of reference groups introduces cognitive processes
into the relationship between strategic groups and strategy formulation. Research by
Porac, Thomas and Emme (1987), Reger (1987), Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller
(1989) and Porac and Thomas (1990) suggest that a manager's cognitive map of an
industry will probably produce a different strategic grouping of an industry than that
suggested in an IO oriented approach. Using IO driven ideas of what grouping
should occur in retail markets these researchers contrasted "objective" economics-based
maps to the cognitive or "perceptual" maps of the practitioners. In one study (Porac
& Thomas, 1987) comparisons between the researcher's expectations of groupings and
the cognitive categorization of the practitioners showed some surprisingly different
results. Although the researchers anticipated other groupings, the groupings of the
practitioners were not "irrational". On the contrary, how the retailers in all of these
studies positioned themselves and their competition made perfect sense to them. All
of these papers suggest that it is the practitioner's conceptualization of the intra-
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industry structure enacted relative to the environment, not that of the researchers,
which create the heterogenous patterns of competition exhibited by strategic groups.
This makes sense. The groups are based on patterns of resource allocation decisions
and the practitioners, not the researchers, are making resource allocation decisions for
the firms based on their "perceptual" map of competition in the industry.
The cognitive approach to strategic groups has been studied empirically by
Reger (1988) and Porac, et al. (1989) in two industry contexts, namely, banking and
knitwear. Reger had 23 practitioners individually map the competitive positions of 18
holding companies in the Chicago banking industry. She then compared the maps
each constructed. Reger felt that if groupings are drawn based upon these patterns of
competition, then a common map should be shared by each participant. Although her
results were not as strong as she hoped, they clearly indicated the existence of a
collective view, or grouping, among most respondents concerning most firms. The
strong implication is that this cognitive grouping is shaping the strategy formulation
decisions of these bankers. In a similar manner, Porac et al., (1989) found the
existence of cognitive communities (groups) in the context of the Scottish knitwear
industry. The managers interviewed in and around Hawick, Scotland produced a clear
grouping within the knitwear industry for themselves based on factors such as high
price, fully-fashioned design, exclusive distribution outlets and quality image.
Interviews tended to show common maps here, too, but it was also clear that some
members of the group did not share the same view of the market opportunities they
faced. In the study they exhibit conflicting maps of how competition should be
11
structured within the industry. The perceived prototype of the group is "a small firm
manufacturing high quality fully-fashioned cardigans and pullovers" (Porac et al.,
1989:411). Some managers are uncomfortable with a few of the larger Scottish
producers who have begun to
contradict the conventual wisdom of focusing upon 'classical elegance' by
developing lines of 'sports' garments such as cotton golf sweaters. Managers
outside these firms regarded such developments with destain, and complained
that they represent a dilution of "Scottish quality".
Porac et al., (1989:411).
Apparently the managers themselves used difficult frameworks and variables to
understand competition and there was cognitive dissonance among them. They
focused on a range of key success factors e.g. fashion, quality, but did not, apparently,
focus on size as a differentiating variable even though they were aware of size
differences. In this respect, their competitive frames would differ from those
suggested by IO economists (e.g. Porter (1980)) who would typically correlate size
with key variables in framing a competitive analysis.
In this cognitive model firm resources are still allocated based on
heterogeneous patterns of competition just as in Model 1 above. The difference is
that the groups examined in the strategy formulation process are the many alternative
cognitive constructions of each practitioner, not a single objectively drawn map.
Reger and Huff (1989) argue that such maps are generally common among industry
members with some overlap around the edges.
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We can assume that the same external discontinuities which would upset the
objective constructions in Model 1 would also upset the cognitive constructions of
strategic groups. The impact, however, is now on cognitive processes, as it is through
that process that the external world must pass. Using the same variable definitions as
in Model 1 we can now construct a second Model representing strategic groupings in
each time period as Cognitive Groupings (CGt ); groupings that exist in the mind of
the strategist. In the Model 2 framework the Reference Group (RG) idea from
Fiegenbaum (1987) is added for inclusiveness as an input to the cognitive groupings
(CG).
Insert Figure 2 about here
PROBLEMS WITH THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS PRESENTED
The two models described so far present a conundrum so long as we hold to
the idea that there is only one relevant strategic group structure in any time period,
while also finding both arguments compelling. One way out of this dilemma would be
to define strategic groups as "only" those groups which are either "objective" or
"cognitive". The remaining schema is then defined as something other then a strategic
group. This would be an easy solution if our aim is to define our way out of
problems simply by restating the world. But it is precisely because we say that
strategic groups explain heterogeneous grouping patterns in resource allocation
decisions that both representations have claims to validity. Both represent grouping
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patterns, both suggest that group members will respond in ways similar to one another
and dissimilar to members of other groups and both suggest that managers see fellow
group members as their primary competitors (Fiegenbaum, 1987; Porter, 1980). These
conclusions apply equally to both conceptualizations and are in line with the raison
d'etre for studying strategic groupings in Strategic Management. It could be suggested
that the objective groupings and the cognitive groupings are one and the same.
However, there is a strong body of research suggesting that between an "objective
reality" and a manager's perception of reality a significant bias or distortion may occur
(Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 1984; Dawes, 1988) and it is the manager's
perception after passing through that process which is taken into the strategy
formulation process. This pool of research and its underlying rationale constitutes a
strong argument in favor of strategy adopting a cognitive oriented research design.
But strong arguments in favor of a more objective, economic oriented measurement
process exist as well. For example, return to the upset Scottish knitwear executive
discussed earlier. The complaints of some group members were directed at two larger
firms which were abandoning the "classic elegance" focus strategy of the other
members of the cognitive group in favor of a broader line which included
"sportswear". The managing director of one firm told the interviewer:
The Barries and the Glenmacs are very good because they are trying to
preserve quality. They are a good force in Scottish Knitwear. The 'niggers in
the woodpile' are the Lyle & Scotts and the Pringles who have become so big
that they lost their direction.
Porac, et. al. (1989:411)
From the standpoint of the "objective", IO Economics view it could be stated that the
clear point the manager is missing is the role of the most basic of IO variables, size,
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in shaping strategy. However it is equally true that what ever role size may play in
shaping strategy, the general manager here sees groupings based on geography. With
a simple classification concept (such as "Scottish Knitwear") humans cognitively assume
a number of other traits (Porac & Thomas 1990). As a result the manager above
assumes a whole strategy which should be followed by all group members and
concludes that "the Lyle & Scotts and the Pringles" have "lost their direction", with
potential negative performance consequences for the remaining firms in their inter-
dependent group. The manager does recognize the role size plays in distinguishing
his firm from the large firms, but this has just as clearly not been incorporated into
his cognitive map. Both "objective" and "cognitive" maps contribute to understanding
this example, but neither of the two alternatives alone is sufficient to fully explain the
role of firm groupings in the strategy formulation process, in spite of their extensive
use in prior research. There exists a need to develop a third model which integrates
both perspectives.
BASIS FOR A DYNAMIC MODEL OF OBJECTIVE
AND COGNITIVE GROUPINGS
One way to approach such a problem is to observe how similar problems are
handled in related disciplines. There is a similar debate concerning the nature of
environments found in the Organization Theory literature. Pfeffer and Salancik point
out that the external environment and its interactions with the organization provide
the "raw material out of which the enacted environment is formed" (1978:63), and "if
organizations can plan behavior only with respect to their constructions of the
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environment and its meaning, then to speak of context separate from a particular
focal organization makes little sense" (1978:73), making a strong case for pursuing
"perceptual" groupings. They note later, however, that cognitively constructed
environments face the problem of not correctly perceiving, "all the external groups it
depends on or the relative importance of each" (1978:79). This point emphasizes the
importance to managers of pursuing as objective a view as possible with respect to
the external environment. As Scott says, "what you don't know can hurt (or help)
you" (emphasis in the original, Scott, 1981:173). We now have the same arguments
for both aggressively pursuing objectivity and for carefully measuring subjective
perception in dealing with this Organization Theory question as we had with the
strategic group question.
Scott offers a suggestion for escaping the paradox - one as valid for
organization researchers as strategy researchers. Scott says, "ones measurement
strategy should depend on what is being predicted" (1981:173). He then elaborates:
perceptual measures are necessary if we wish to predict the choices or behavior
of organizational participants, but they are not sufficient if we wish to predict
the outcome of these choices
Scott, (1981:173)
Scott's point seems to be that both views are valid at different points in a model
which includes both factors. This clearly implies that in a comprehensive model both
views must be included and no one perspective dominates. The focus should depend
on the part of the model being studied. For strategic groups this suggests that in
modeling the full process of strategy formulation two strategic groups are influencing a
16
firm's resource allocation decision at any one point in time: A grouping grounded in a
search for objective realism and a grouping based on how the top management team
perceives that industry. The first grouping is the "raw material" (in Pfeffer and
Salancik's terms) for the second. The second grouping influences resource allocation
decisions and those resource allocation decisions, in turn, affect the first grouping.
This simultaneous consideration of Objective Groups (OGs) and Cognitive Groups
(CGs) represent major change in the third Model. (See Porac et al. (1989), and
Porac and Thomas (1990) for a further discussion on simultaneous consideration of
both objective and subjective factors in research.)
Such a situation is illustrated by the Knitwear manager discussed earlier and
the knitwear industry. The "objective" distinction between his firm and the larger
firms has clearly disrupted his cognitive map. It is equally clear that the managing
directors of the large firms have a different view of the opportunities which the
competitive environment holds for Scottish firms and they are making resource
allocation decisions in accordance with those beliefs. These decisions over time result
in a clearly different strategy being followed by the large firms based on the scope of
their product lines.
It is now suggested that two groupings Objective Groups (OGs) and Cognitive
Groups (CGs) are both impacted by factors such as technological change (TC),
legal/political/regulatory change (RC) and by other firm's resource allocation
decisions (OFRADs). Stable strategic time periods are ended by the perception of
17
such discontinuities and the resulting changes in the resource allocation decisions of
some firms in the industry. Cognitive groupings (CGs) are also affected by the
Reference Group (RG) concept, but Objective Groups (OGs) are not. Adding
periods of stability and change over time, the following model emerges:
Insert Figure 3 about here.
IMPLICATIONS, PROPOSITIONS AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES
The integrated model just presented does not simplify the role of strategic
groups in strategy formulation. Instead, by being more inclusive it creates a more
complex picture of how conceptualizations of intra-industry structure effect both the
formulation process and the resource allocation decisions researchers observe. This
third view represents a significant departure from the more exclusive views behind the
first two models. In a broader framework of modeling and theorizing the exclusivity
is not uncommon. While it is not the point of this paper to dissolve into a discussion
of theoretical frameworks, a few paragraphs of digression may now be in order so as
to better contrast the third view presented.
The IO Economic model is based on a paradigm which views concepts such as
strategic groups with positivism, determinism and realism, what Burrell and Morgan
18
called the, "objective approach to social science" (1979:3). Strategy researchers
conducting studies on the beer industry at Purdue attempted to separate themselves
somewhat from approaches taken by the Harvard, IO stream (Hatten, Schendel and
Cooper, 1978), but the same paradigm base was retained. Here, the Purdue and
Harvard streams are argued to be distinctive due to their research perspective (Cool,
1985), that is, they assume this objective approach.
The research and model associated with Reger (1988) and Porac and his
colleagues is using a framework which is different in its paradigm base. By searching
out the perceptive reality of the individual manager and describing the nature of
competition in terms of the labels these practitioners apply, their research takes a
nominalistic and anti-positivist position. These two paradigms are logically
inconsistent with each other in the framework Burrell and Morgan used. The
resulting Model 3 which has been presented here can not, therefore, be seen as a
combination of the two - they are fundamentally incompatible. Rather, it should be
seen as a third perspective based on a conceptualization not found in either of the
first two models.
The third model stakes out the conceptual position that the processes observed
and the outputs measured when analyzing resource allocation decisions or similar
decisions are responses to two sources of influence. Whether it be the strategic
grouping of competitors, or the performance influences studied by Hansen and
Wernerfelt (1989), or some other process, both cognitive and objective variables need
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to be included in models and measured in research. Both must be recognized as
contributing to the outcomes observed as well as to each other. The third model
does this by incorporating both groupings is a process which interacts over time.
Propositions can now be presented regarding this third model. First through
direct and indirect means both conceptualizations of groupings impact observed
behavior, whether resource allocation decisions or performance. Therefore, any
attempt to model or explain the intra-industry structure's import should include both.
PI Performance and resource allocation decisions are influenced by
economic groups within an industry and the perceptions of those groups held
by the dominant coalition.
P2 Resource allocation decisions are influenced more by cognitive
perceptions of strategic groups then by economic groups.
P3 Resource allocation decisions directly affect economic groupings of
firms in intra-industry structure.
P4 Other factors, such as technological change, impact both economic
and cognitive groupings.
These propositions lead to a circular path of causation over time.
20
It does not mean that either of the two methodologies of Strategic Group
researchers discussed in the first part of the paper are not valid. Indeed, both are
valid, but in a more limited context. The context should be seen as consistent with
Scott's point about research focus: The focus of a particular research question should
indicate a focus on Objective maps or Cognitive maps. For example, to anticipate the
impact of a future event on firms would require an "objective" grouping analysis and
an understanding of objective maps and their relationships to firm strategies. Factors
such as firm size, degrees of vertical integration, capital structuring and geographic
scope would probably be included in the analysis. On the other hand, to anticipate
how managers will respond is a cognitive, sense making question. Here groups should
be drawn based on perceptions of group membership. This can be done by looking
at cognitive maps embedded in resource allocation decisions of the firm's dominant
coalition relative to key strategic success factors such as advertising spending, R&D
expenditures and acquisition policy. It must be remembered, however, that Model 3
is an interactive model. The variables are not mutually exclusive and because the two
groupings influence each other over time, the variables both directly and indirectly
influence each grouping. The interaction described here should not be ignored just to
satisfy a desire for a simplicity which only exists in theoretical extremes.
Such a requirement suggests the use of Path Analysis techniques for this type
of research. Path analysis is widely used in sociology, political science (Hanushek and
Jackson, 1977) and has become more regularly used in strategic management by
21
researchers such as Woo (1987). Path models and techniques provide several
advantages for future research. The ability to measure direct, indirect and total
effects provides a richer understanding of causal relationships and intermediaries. For
example, we may find that economic models may be correlated with resource
allocation decisions but the causal influence would be seen through a direct effect
through cognitive groupings. In general, the models discussed here all are based on
underlying beliefs about relationships in the real world. Those relationships involve
chains of events and interactions between variables which provide the most insight and
which path models address.
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